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The bipartisanship of appointments to the foreign policy
bureaucracy is more affected by domestic factors than
international.
Many academics and commentators on American foreign policy have maintained that since the
end of the Vietnam and Cold Wars, foreign policy-making has become subject to the kind of
partisan political battles that have long afflicted domestic politics. By using data on over 1,000
individual appointees to the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy Michael Flynn tests this view, and
finds that there is no evidence to support the idea that bipartisanship in appointments has
undergone a structural shift. He argues that domestic political conditions play an important part in
promoting bipartisanship, and that as Congress has become more polarized, bipartisan
appointments have become increasingly scarce. He warns that we should expect to see less
bipartisan cooperation through presidential appointments in the future. 
The idea that foreign policy and national security issues are somehow exempt from the partisan rancor that often
characterizes domestic politics is perhaps best encapsulated by the old adage, “politics stops at the water’s edge.”
In American foreign policy, nowhere is this spirit better exemplified than by President Franklin Roosevelt’s
appointment of Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War. Since World War II, Stimson and other prominent
bureaucratic appointees—such as Robert Lovett and John McCloy—have come to represent this ideal. This
phenomenon of bipartisan cooperation that is held to have characterized the early Cold War period has been
popularly referred to as the “Cold War Consensus”, or as “Establishment” bipartisanship.
However, following the Vietnam War pronouncements of the collapse of this bipartisan consensus became
commonplace. Similar claims followed the end of the Cold War, and more recently, the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Indeed, such assertions have become common in discussions of American foreign policy,
with the broader substantive implication being that the conduct of American foreign policy has become
increasingly erratic and subject to the kind of partisan political battles that have long afflicted domestic politics.
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Some of my recent work evaluates just how closely these stylized truths match up with reality. Earlier accounts of
the breakdown of bipartisanship in foreign policymaking relied largely on anecdotal accounts or individual’s
assertions with little in the way of systematic evidence (see here, here, and here). Some work by political
scientists has done better in approaching the concepts of bipartisanship and consensus in a more systematic way
(see here, here, here, and here). Still, there are some gaps that my work tries to address. First, earlier qualitative
works often focused on elite bureaucratic policymakers (like Stimson), while quantitative studies have tended to
focus on congressional voting patterns or public opinion. Second, foreign policy scholars often view bipartisan
cooperation through the lens of foreign threats and crises, ignoring or downplaying more basic domestic political
pressures that may drive bipartisanship. My work aims to apply a more systematic form of analysis to the subject
of bipartisanship in presidential appointments, while also assessing the relative importance of domestic and
international factors in affecting bipartisan cooperation.
Using data on over 1,000 individual appointees to the foreign policy bureaucracy—agencies like the State
Department and the Department of Defense—I identified those individual appointees who were members of the
opposition party (e.g., Republican serving in a Democratic administration). Figure 1 shows the number of
bipartisan appointees in a given year between 1948 and 2011. While this is only a starting point, it does not lend
much support to the conventional narrative regarding the apparent collapse of bipartisanship following either
Vietnam or the end of the Cold War. In fact, the early Cold War period sees some of the lowest counts observed in
the data.
Figure 1 — Annual count of bipartisan appointees, 1948–2011
However, Figure 1 does not provide
us with any insights into the effects of
a wider range of variables that might
be influencing bipartisanship.
Accordingly, I modeled the probability
of observing a bipartisan appointment
in a given year as a function of these
different forces. Briefly stated, I find
no evidence to support the idea that
bipartisanship has undergone a
structural shift following either
Vietnam or the end of the Cold War.
In fact, as is displayed in Figure 2,
each party’s probability of making a
bipartisan appointment has
converged when comparing the pre-
and post-Vietnam periods. Though it
may be contrary to our expectations,
this finding makes sense when we
consider the domestic political
environment of the early Cold War
period. The McCarthy hearings, as
well as the long absence of
Republicans from the White House,
help to explain the scarcity of
bipartisan appointments during some of the early Cold War years.
Figure 2 — Predicted probability of a bipartisan appointment by party and time period 
Similarly, I find no evidence that US conflict involvement promotes bipartisanship. On the contrary, my findings
indicate conflict involvement actually has a negative effect on bipartisanship. As Figure 3 shows, the predicted
probability of observing a bipartisan appointment decreases as the duration of US war involvement increases.
Furthermore, these results actually match the findings of previous studies. Using different metrics, an earlier study
by Peter Trubowitz and Nicole Mellow also finds a negative correlation between international crises and
bipartisanship in Congressional voting. This negative relationships is likely due to the increasingly contentious and
politicized nature of particularly long military engagements.
Figure 4 — Predicted probability of a bipartisan appointment as a function of war duration
Lastly, I find that domestic political conditions play an important part in promoting bipartisanship. I argue that
bipartisan appointments can serve to compensate presidents for lower levels of partisan support in Congress and
aid in the construction of moderate coalitions. However, this dynamic only works when the parties are close and
there are moderate legislators in Congress with whom the president and his appointees can work. But as the
parties in Congress have become more polarized, moderate legislators have become increasingly scarce. Figure
4 illustrates this dynamic. At low levels of polarization, a decrease in the number of seats that the president’s party
controls in Congress leads to an increase in the probability of seeing a bipartisan appointment. As polarization
increases the size of this effect becomes smaller, eventually becoming negative.
Figure 5 — Marginal effect of a decrease in presidential support in Congress on the probability of a
bipartisan appointment
Note: Gray box denotes area of statistical insignificance.
Overall, these findings cast doubt on some of the conventional wisdoms surrounding American foreign policy,
pointing instead to the importance of the domestic political environment in promoting bipartisanship. Accordingly,
my research suggests that we should expect to see less bipartisan cooperation through presidential appointments
moving forward. The fact that polarization unfolds over several years at a time also suggests that this trend is
unlikely to reverse itself any time soon. President Obama’s retention of Robert Gates, and his appointment of
Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense, would seem to provide some evidence to the contrary. However, while
these appointments are surely important, they are not necessarily indicative of broader trends. 
This article is based on the paper The International and Domestic Sources of Bipartisanship in U.S. Foreign
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